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69 
DISCRIMINATORY DUALISM IN PROCESS:  
TITLE IX, REVERSE TITLE IX, AND CAMPUS 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 
SARAH L. SWAN
* 
For decades, the Title IX process of adjudicating campus sexual assault 
has been heavily weighted against complainants (usually women). 
However, at some universities, this weighting has recently flipped, such that 
Title IX procedures at these institutions now seem weighted not against 
complainants, but against respondents (usually men). This “reverse Title 
IX” trend is typically described as an overcorrection, stemming from 
schools’ over-zealous attempts to comply with the Title IX requirements the 
Obama Administration imposed in 2011. 
This Article offers a different account of Title IX’s procedural flip. It 
argues that Title IX’s procedural switch can be productively viewed 
through the lens of discriminatory dualism. Discriminatory dualism posits 
that structural discrimination frequently divides into two seemingly 
opposite—but in fact mutually supportive—strands. Applying the theory of 
discriminatory dualism here suggests that reverse Title IX is not a mere 
overcorrection. Instead, it is part of a patterned, recurring, and common 
way that structural discrimination upholds existing social hierarchies.  
Echoing other examples of discriminatory dualism, Title IX’s twinned 
procedural problems work to sustain existing gendered and social 
hierarchies in three main ways. First, procedural unfairness to respondents 
functions to “confirm” the stereotype underlying the initial procedural 
problems with Title IX: that women are not credible witnesses and are 
committed, at all costs, to punishing men for perceived slights and 
imagined harms. Second, the emergence of the reverse Title IX strand 
undermines the complaints about unfairness to complainants, suggesting 
that they are misplaced and that the “real” problem is discrimination 
against men. The confusion created by these dueling complaints 
undermines the legitimacy of the Title IX system of adjudication as a whole, 
rendering all findings potentially suspect. Finally, Title IX’s discriminatory 
dualism creates a double bind, under which universities are portrayed as 
                                                                                                             
 * Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. This Article was 
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only capable of adjudicating in ways that are either unfair to complainants 
or unfair to respondents. These consequences all work to the detriment of 
those seeking gender equality. 
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I. Introduction 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 declares that “[n]o 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”
1
 With a wide ambit that includes harassment and sexual 
violence within its parameters,
2
 Title IX is an important legal vehicle for 
preventing and remedying gender discrimination at educational 
institutions.
3
 Title IX does not require universities to “guarantee[] the good 
behavior” of students or completely “purge . . . campus of sexual 
misconduct,” but it does require schools to avoid “deliberate indifference” 
to these problems.
4
 If school officials know about sexual misconduct 
problems but decline to address them, the school can be liable for damages 
                                                                                                             
 1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 2. Title IX, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/college-resources/title-ix/ 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2020). The scope of Title IX was explicit in the 2011 Dear Colleague 
Letter, which declared that “[s]exual harassment of students, which includes acts of sexual 
violence, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.” See Letter from Russlynn 
Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed. 
gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter]. 
 3. Other legal vehicles include negligence claims and breach-of-contract claims. See 
Liability for Student Sexual Assault: UE’s Claims Say OCR and Title IX Are Not the Biggest 
Dangers, UNITED EDUCATORS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/ 
search?q=cache:RND2NEXRPDgJ:https://www.ue.org/risk-management/insights-blog/%3 
Fid%3D3287+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari. 
 4. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020). See 
also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). This Article uses the term “university” broadly to include 
colleges and other post-secondary institutions as well. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/5
2020]    DISCRIMINATORY DUALISM IN PROCESS 71 
 
 
in court.
5
 Schools can also be liable for not taking “adequate preventative 
steps” to discourage sexual misconduct.
6
 And the Office of Civil Rights can 
bring administrative enforcement proceedings if institutions do not comply 
with Title IX.
7
 
However, despite these mandates and enforcement mechanisms, prior to 
2011 Title IX provided virtually no meaningful redress for those who 
experienced campus sexual violence.
8
 “Institutional barriers . . . 
encourage[d] students to stay quiet,” and the students who did come 
forward to file complaints found themselves embroiled in antiquated and 
hostile procedural rules that “le[ft] them feeling victimized again.”
9
 These 
                                                                                                             
 5. The High Cost of Student Victim Sexual Assault Claims and What Institutions Can 
Do, CANOPY PROGRAMS (Mar. 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53e530a1 
e4b021a99e4dc012/t/590501f74402431ac4900596/1493500411575/FN-+RE-+2017.04-
+High+Cost+of+Student-Victim+SA+Claims.pdf [hereinafter CANOPY PROGRAMS]. 
 6. See Susan D. Friedfel & Jason A. Ross, University’s Handling of Students’ Pre-
Assault Complaints of Sexual Misconduct Open to Title IX Claim, JACKSONLEWIS (Feb. 14, 
2020), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/university-s-handling-students-pre-assault 
-complaints-sexual-misconduct-open-title-ix-claim (citing Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1111–12) 
(describing the “‘pre-assault’ theory of deliberate indifference toward sexual assault on 
campus,” where “the plaintiff alleges the university . . . did not take adequate preemptive 
steps to avoid or lessen the likelihood of sexual misconduct on campus”). Under this theory 
of liability, “the university is liable if a plaintiff is victimized by the sexual misconduct the 
university should have helped avoid” or misconduct that comes about through the school 
“maintaining ‘a policy of deliberate indifference that heighten[s] the risk of sexual 
harassment on campus’ prior to a sexual assault.” Id. See generally Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX 
and Official Policy Liability: Maximizing the Law’s Potential to Hold Education Institutions 
Accountable for Their Responses to Sexual Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 35 (2020). 
 7. CANOPY PROGRAMS, supra note 5. Importantly, “[w]hat funding recipients’ 
responsibilities are under Title IX and what they can be held liable for in a private cause of 
action for damages . . . are not one and the same.” Doe v. Bibb Cty. Sch. Dist., 126 F. Supp. 
3d 1366, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2015), aff’d, 688 F. App’x 791 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 8. Most victims of sexual assault are women. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 18 (NOV. 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/ 
pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf; see also Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for 
Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity. 
org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/D379-ALQY]. Yet 
men can also be victims of sexual assault. For some of the challenges men face when 
attempting to receive redress for sexual assault they experience on campus and off, see 
Alexandra Flanagan & Phoenix Tso, Inside the Student Activist Movement: Tufts and Sexual 
Violence, JEZEBEL (Feb. 19, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://jezebel.com/inside-the-student-activist-
movement-tufts-university-1526094401, and see generally Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2011).  
 9. JD Solomon, Sexual Assaults on Campus: Journalist Talks About “Frustrating 
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rules included requirements that complainants produce independent 
corroborating evidence, meet a higher burden of proof than is typical in a 
civil case, and file their complaints within a short window.
10
 Given that 
sexual assault typically occurs in private with no additional direct witnesses 
other than the parties, and that it often takes a complainant some time to 
decide whether they want to pursue justice within formal remedial 
channels, these hurdles proved insurmountable to many.
11
 Under these 
procedural standards, “campus adjudications were often confusing, 
‘shrouded in secrecy,’ and marked by lengthy delays,”
12
 and sexual assault 
victims only rarely received redress.
13
 
Following intense media scrutiny of these widespread institutional 
failures to address campus sexual assault,
14
 the Obama administration in 
2011 sought to change this status quo. It issued a non-binding Dear 
Colleague Letter instructing universities to implement more equitable 
                                                                                                             
Search for Justice,” UNIV. BUS. (Mar. 19, 2014), https://universitybusiness.com/sexual-
assaults-on-campus-journalist-talks-about-frustrating-search-for-justice/; see also Rachael A. 
Goldman, Note, When Is Due Process Due? The Impact of Title IX Sexual Assault 
Adjudication on the Rights of University Students, 47 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 185, 207 (2020).  
 10. See, e.g., Wendy J. Murphy, Using Title IX’s “Prompt and Equitable” Hearing 
Requirements to Force Schools to Provide Fair Judicial Proceedings to Redress Sexual 
Assault on Campus, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2006); Michelle J. Anderson, 
Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1943 
(2016). 
 11. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 1018. 
 12. Goldman, supra note 9, at 187. 
 13. After examining a survey of 152 college-crisis-services programs, ten years of Title 
IX complaints, and interviews with fifty experts, one study concluded that students found 
responsible for perpetrating campus sexual assaults often faced “little or no consequence[s].” 
Lombardi, supra note 8; see also Goldman, supra note 9, at 187–88 (citing Nick Anderson, 
Colleges Often Reluctant to Expel for Sexual Violence, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/colleges-often-reluctant-to-expel-for-
sexual-violence--with-u-va-a-prime-example/2014/12/15/307c5648-7b4e-11e4-b821-
503cc7efed9e_story.html) (“Nationally, in 2014, only 12% of the 478 sanctions for sexual 
assault on university campuses were expulsions, meaning that the other 88% of guilty 
perpetrators received some other form of discipline (or none at all).”). Some schools, like the 
University of Virginia, used the sanction so rarely that between 2004 and 2014, the 
University of Virginia did not expel a single student for sexual misconduct, even though 
“many students” had been expelled for other misconduct. Id.  
 14. Hannah Walsh, Note, Further Harm and Harassment: The Cost of Excess Process 
to Victims of Sexual Violence on College Campuses, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1785 
(2020).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/5
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procedures.
15
 In its wake, however, some universities blew past the letter’s 
recommendations and adopted their own procedural rules that drastically 
departed from those suggested.
16
 Though the letter encouraged universities 
to implement fair procedures that would grant both parties similar access to 
information and similar opportunities to be heard, some schools instead 
implemented procedures that actively disadvantaged respondents.
17
 For 
instance, some schools set up procedures that denied respondents access to 
basic materials, including the investigative report, the “notice of the factual 
basis of the charges, the evidence gathered,” and “the identities of 
witnesses.”
18
 At these schools, Title IX adjudication essentially flipped 
from being weighted against complainants to being weighted against 
respondents. Evidentiary hurdles that complainants could not possibly 
overcome and cursory hearings designed to favor respondents transformed 
into presumptions and procedures that were instead unfair to respondents. 
This flip is most commonly described as an “over-correction” brought 
about by schools simply trying too hard to meet the Obama-era 
guidelines.
19
 This Article offers a different account for this phenomenon. It 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 2. 
 16. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and Procedural Fairness: Why Disciplined-Student 
Litigation Does Not Undermine the Role of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault, 78 MONT. L. 
REV. 71, 82–84 (2017) (observing that complaints regarding colleges’ response to sexual 
violence have increased since the Dear Colleague Letter and that there have been findings of 
colleges utilizing procedures that do not adhere to the letter’s recommendations).  
 17. Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title IX 2 (Aug. 21, 
2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/Fairness%20for%20All%20 
Students.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; see Buzuvis, supra note 16, at 72 n.5 (first citing Emily Yoffe, The College 
Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but
_the_efforts.html; then Gregg Bernstein, An Overcorrection on Campus Sexual Assault 
Policies?, BALT. SUN (Feb. 15, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-
ed/bs-ed-bernstein-0215-20150214-story.html; and then Max Kutner, The Other Side of the 
Sexual Assault Crisis, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2015, 5:33 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
2015/12/18/other-side-sexual-assault-crisis-403285.html); see also Walsh, supra note 14, at 
1787 nn. 11–15 (citing Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law Sch. Faculty on Sexual 
Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and Accused Students at Universities (Feb. 18, 
2015), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2015_0218_upenn.pdf); Editorial 
Board, New Guidance on Campus Sexual Assault Is Ill-Timed and Partially Ill-Advised. But 
It’s Not a Return to the Bad Old Days, WASH. POST (May 19, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/new-guidance-on-campus-sexual-assault-is-ill-timed-and-
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argues that a situation in which some schools use procedures that are 
stacked against complainants, while others use procedures that are stacked 
against respondents,
20
 is productively viewed as an example of 
discriminatory dualism.
21
 Discriminatory dualism describes structural 
discrimination’s frequent tendency to divide into two seemingly opposite, 
but in fact mutually supportive strands.
22
 Often in response to agitations for 
social change or to legal interventions which make one path less tenable, 
structural discrimination sometimes separates into two strands that seem 
distinct and contradictory, but are actually two sides of the same coin.
23
 
These two opposing discriminatory practices work together to reinforce 
social hierarchies and maintain systems of subordination.
24
  
Discriminatory dualism appears in multiple contexts, with notable 
examples occurring in employment, housing, and policing.
25
 For instance, 
discriminatory dualism appears in employment when female employees 
receive both unwanted sexual attention in the form of sexual harassment 
and shunning in the form of coworkers refusing to engage with them 
entirely.
26
 A similar paradox exists in housing, where minority 
homeownership is suppressed by both redlining—the denial of credit based 
on race—and reverse redlining—the over-offering of credit on exploitative 
terms.
27
 And in policing, communities of color paradoxically experience 
both overpolicing in the form of the aggressive overenforcement of minor, 
petty crime, and underpolicing in the form of the persistent failure to 
address violent crime.
28
 Along with these examples, the phenomenon of 
                                                                                                             
partially-ill-advised-but-its-not-a-return-to-the-bad-old-days/2020/05/19/f6aaedc2-9941-
11ea-ac72-3841fcc9b35f_story.html.  
 20. See Buzuvis, supra note 16, at 83–84 (observing practices schools have adopted that 
disadvantage complainants); Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1 (noting that Harvard 
University’s procedures are “overwhelmingly stacked against the accused”).  
 21. The discussion of discriminatory dualism in notes 22–30, 79–84, 100–06 and 
accompanying text largely initially appeared in Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism, 54 
GA. L. REV. 869 (2020).  
 22. Id. at 872. 
 23. Id. at 873. Discriminatory dualism is a form of adaptive discrimination. See Elise C. 
Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016). 
 24. Swan, supra note 21, at 872. 
 25. Id. at 873. 
 26. Id. at 872–73. 
 27. Id. at 872. 
 28. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/5
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discriminatory dualism also occurs in many other countries and in many 
additional contexts.
29
 
The lens of discriminatory dualism helps to show that flips into a reverse 
discriminatory form are not mere overcorrections: they are a patterned, 
recurring, and common way that structural discrimination upholds existing 
hierarchies and perpetuates preservation-through-transformation.
30
 By 
developing into two contradictory forms, structural discrimination 
ironically manages to maintain and perpetuate the same inequalities that 
fueled its original form. With the emergence of “reverse Title IX”—Title 
IX adjudications that procedurally disadvantage defendants
31
—Title IX 
adjudication has also become an example of discriminatory dualism.  
Title IX’s discriminatory dualism, though, has an interesting twist: at 
first it appears as though the group receiving the discrimination has 
changed.
32
 Title IX processes once clearly disadvantaged women, and now 
at some schools it seems like they may disadvantage men.
33
 But applying 
the theory of discriminatory dualism suggests that this second strand of 
procedural unfairness ultimately functions to reinforce existing gender and 
social hierarchies. On a collective and structural level, women remain the 
group that will lose most by Title IX’s discriminatory dualism.
34
  
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. at 872 n.1 (noting that under and overpolicing has been observed in Canada and 
Australia, a phenomenon similar to redlining and reverse redlining has been observed in 
South Africa and New Zealand, and sexual harassment and shunning has been observed in 
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea). Discriminatory dualism also 
occurs in higher education, through the pattern of denial and then exploitative over-access 
for racial minorities. Id. at 922. Additionally, discriminatory dualism has occurred in the 
context of marriage, through coverture and reverse coverture, denying and then over-
prescribing marriage as a cure for poverty, and denying and then obligating marriage in the 
LGBTQ context. See Sarah L. Swan, Marrying Discriminatory Dualism (May 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 30. Preservation-through-transformation is a term coined by Professor Reva Siegel, 
describing the phenomena that occur when “[e]fforts to reform a status regime bring about 
changes in its rule structure and justificatory rhetoric,” yet the discrimination itself persists. 
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997). 
 31. See Greta Anderson, More Title IX Lawsuits by Accusers and Accused, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED. (October 3, 2019) (crediting attorney Laura Dunn for introducing the term 
“reverse Title IX”), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/03/students-look-
federal-courts-challenge-title-ix-proceedings.  
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
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This is so for three reasons. Discriminatory dualism often involves 
seemingly confirmed stereotypes, confusion surrounding identifying the 
“real” problem, and the creation of a double-bind in which the only 
available options are discriminatory.
35
 Those three characteristics are 
present in this iteration of discriminatory dualism as well. First, procedural 
unfairness to respondents functions to “confirm” the stereotype underlying 
the initial procedural problems with Title IX: that women are not credible 
witnesses and are committed, at all costs, to punishing men for perceived 
slights and imagined harms. Second, reverse Title IX undermines the 
arguments about the continuing problem of unfairness to complainants at 
many institutions and sows confusion over the nature of Title IX’s “real” or 
most significant problem. This confusion destabilizes and discredits the 
entire system of Title IX adjudication, rendering all findings of 
responsibility in the Title IX context seemingly suspect. Finally, Title IX’s 
discriminatory dualism establishes a double bind, under which universities 
are portrayed as only able to adjudicate in ways that are either procedurally 
unfair to complainants or procedurally unfair to respondents, but simply 
incapable of adjudicating fairly.  
Systems of discriminatory dualism often last decades (sometimes even 
centuries),
36
 and their histories show multiple oscillations between each 
strand rising and falling in dominance.
37
 At this particular point in time, 
Title IX is also in a moment of profound oscillation. In response to the 
procedurally untenable situation created by the discriminatory dualism of 
unfairness to complainants and unfairness to respondents, the Trump 
administration released new Title IX regulations in the spring of 2020.
38
 
Among other controversial changes, these regulations allow for a higher 
evidentiary standard and re-import presumptions rooted in criminal law.
39
 
As these changes take effect, those seeking Title IX’s promise of gender 
equality fear the reforms will push Title IX back to once again weighting 
adjudications almost universally against complainants.
40
 The historic 
                                                                                                             
 35. Swan, supra note 21, at 901. 
 36. See id. at 925. 
 37. See id. at 873. 
 38. These new regulations became binding on August 14, 2020. See Melinda Kaufmann, 
The Deadline for Updating Your Title IX Policies is Fast Approaching: Will Your District Be 
Ready?, JDSUPRA (July 29, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-deadline-for-
updating-your-title-ix-77543/.  
 39. See infra notes 155–63.  
 40. See infra notes 164–66. 
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patterns of discriminatory dualism suggests that these fears are well-
founded,
41
 and that until broader social changes are achieved, the goal of 
gender equality through Title IX may remain elusive.  
II. Title IX’s Procedural Problems 
Title IX adjudication for sexual misconduct currently operates in two 
main modes: procedurally unfair to complainants or procedurally unfair to 
respondents.
42
 Although the latter mode has recently received significant 
media attention, thus perhaps giving the impression that it is the primary 
problem in this area,
43
 in actuality sexual misconduct victims bring more 
lawsuits against schools and are more successful in those lawsuits than 
respondents.
44
 As the nation’s largest post-secondary insurer noted in 2018, 
claims related to campus sexual assault constituted the bulk of their payouts 
to universities, and the majority of that bulk “went primarily to victims of 
sexual assault.”
45
 Statistics compiled from 2011–2015 reflect a similar 
reality: of nearly $31 million in claims related to campus sexual assault, 
approximately $22 million went to victims, with the remaining $9 million 
going to those accused of sexual misconduct.
46
  
High payouts to complainants continue to occur because many schools 
continue to participate in the historical tradition of mishandling campus 
sexual assault allegations and skewing Title IX procedures against 
                                                                                                             
 41. Swan, supra note 21, at 873. 
 42. There are also, presumably, some schools which do fairly balance procedures. 
Nevertheless, the volume of litigation on both sides and the fervor over the new rules 
suggest that erring on either side is much more common. 
 43. Sarah L. Swan, Between Title IX and the Criminal Law: Bringing Tort Law to the 
Campus Sexual Assault Debate, 64 KAN. L. REV. 963, 978–79 (2016) (“Although perpetrator 
suits tend to attract more media attention, victims actually bring lawsuits more frequently, 
and those suits end up being more expensive than perpetrator suits.”).  
 44. See Anderson, supra note 31; EDURISK, CONFRONTING CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: 
AN EXAMINATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION CLAIMS 14 (2015) http://www.ncdsv.org/ERS_ 
Confronting-Campus-Sexual-Assault_2015.pdf (“Victims brought the most litigation against 
educational institutions and accounted for 68 percent of the litigated complaints in this 
study.”). Many of these cases allege institutional negligence. Swan, supra note 43, at 979.  
 45. Anderson, supra note 31 (emphasis added).  
 46. Liability for Student Sexual Assault: UE’s Claims Say OCR and Title IX Are Not the 
Biggest Dangers, UNITED EDUCATORS: RISK MGMT. INSIGHTS BLOG (Mar. 17, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/W6MA-AC4Y. 
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complainants.
47
 Notably, schools have often used procedural hurdles that 
“harken back to pre-reform rape law,”
48
 including requirements that 
complaints be “timely” filed, skeptically viewed, and corroborated by 
additional evidence beyond that of the complaining party.
49
  
Statements from Harvard College in the early 2000s typify this approach. 
When considering whether to implement new procedures to govern sexual 
misconduct adjudication, the Dean of the college conveyed that Harvard 
lacked the tools to effectively adjudicate “‘he-said-she-said’ rape 
complaints,”
50
 and enacted the following procedures: 
Complaints must ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely 
manner. The Board typically cannot resolve peer dispute cases in 
which there is little evidence except the conflicting statements of 
the principals. Therefore, the Board ordinarily will not consider a 
case unless the allegations presented by the complaining party 
are supported by independent corroborating evidence. Based on 
the information provided at the time of the complaint, the Board 
will decide whether or not there appears to be sufficient 
corroborating evidence to pursue the complaint.
51
 
Examples of colleges mishandling sexual assault allegations are legion. 
Schools have repeatedly asked complainants questions that “ranged from 
insensitive to insulting,” justified the assaults as the victim’s fault, failed to 
or delayed investigating, offered inadequate hearings with questionable 
findings, failed to provide notice of investigative updates and findings, and 
generally tried to discourage rape reporting.
52
 One student recounted that 
after she informed her school she had been raped by another student, she 
was assigned “an undergraduate student ‘lawyer’” and attended a hearing 
where she was made to “plead[] her case for seven hours before the Honor 
Court, seated at a table with the [student] she sa[id] raped her.”
53
 
Ultimately, the panel concluded that “because she and her rapist hadn’t 
                                                                                                             
 47. See Buzuvis, supra note 6, at 44 (noting plaintiffs’ difficulties in holding 
universities accountable under the deliberate-indifference standard and “lackluster responses 
by university officials” to the sexual-assault problem on university campuses). 
 48. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1983. 
 49. Id. at 1983–84. 
 50. Id. at 1983. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Kayla Webley Adler, Big Shame on Campus, MARIE CLAIRE (Oct. 16, 2013), 
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a8217/big-shame-on-campus/. 
 53. Id. 
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known each other, he couldn't have been aware of how drunk she was or 
that she didn’t like being ‘pushed around.’”
54
  
One high-profile example of unfairness to Title IX complainants 
involved well-known star college football player Jameis Winston.
55
 After 
Erica Kinsman informed Florida State University that Jameis Winston 
raped her, the university waited twenty-four months to conduct a Title IX 
hearing.
56
 Despite substantial compelling evidence, including DNA and 
visible bruising, the university made a finding of no responsibility.
57
 
Significant exposés in film and media revealed botched investigations in 
both the criminal and Title IX context, and Erica Kinsman eventually 
received $950,000 from a civil settlement with Florida State, along with an 
agreement that the university would implement substantial reforms in its 
Title IX process.
58
 
Indeed, at some schools, the institutional response to sexual assault 
allegations has been so systemically egregious that other third parties have 
either imposed sanctions or made specific findings of institutional failings. 
In 2011, Baylor University’s repeated institutional response to sexual 
assault allegations concerning athletes was so troubling that famed college 
athletic association “the Big 12 took the rare, if largely symbolic, step of 
withholding a quarter of Baylor’s payouts—about $6 million.”
59
 Similarly, 
in 2014, the California State Auditor’s investigation of UC Berkeley 
found that from 2009 to 2013, Berkeley did not notify or give 
regular updates to parties involved in investigations of sexual 
misconduct, did not complete investigations in a timely manner, 
and did not ‘sufficiently educate’ staff and students on sexual 
misconduct prevention, which led cases to be mishandled and 
compromised student safety.
60
 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id.  
 55. See Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the 
Constitution in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 638–40 (2016).  
 56. Id. at 639. 
 57. Id. at 640. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Marc Tracy & Dan Barry, The Rise, Then Shame, of Baylor Nation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/sports/baylor-football-sexual-
assault.html.  
 60. Greta Anderson, Increased Legal Scrutiny for Sexual Assault Policies, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/01/31/appeals-
court-holds-university-liable-ineffective-title-ix-policies.  
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But while many schools continue to procedurally disadvantage 
complainants, other schools have recently moved in the opposite direction, 
using procedures that disadvantage respondents.
61
 As one metric, between 
2011 and early 2019, more than 400 respondents sued universities for 
problems related to campus sexual misconduct adjudications.
62
 Nearly half 
of those suits resulted in either settlements or judicial decisions favoring the 
accused student.
63
 
In John Doe v. Purdue University, for example, Doe alleged that after a 
dating relationship ended, he received a letter indicating that his ex-
girlfriend, Jane, had made a complaint of sexual assault against him.
64
 He 
was suspended from his Navy program and banned from any school areas 
where Jane might be.
65
 The school withheld the investigation report from 
John, letting him “review a redacted version” mere “[m]oments before” his 
hearing.
66
 Jane did not appear or submit a written statement; instead, an 
advocate wrote a letter “summarizing [her] accusations.”
67
 At the hearing, 
“[t]wo members of the panel candidly stated that they had not read the 
investigative report,”
68
 but John was nevertheless found responsible. Even 
though Jane was not present at the hearing and never submitted her own 
written statement, it was determined that Jane was “a credible witness,” and 
John was not.
69
  
San Diego State University student Francisco Sousa faced similar 
procedural deficiencies when he was accused of campus sexual assault in 
2014.
70
 The university suspended him on an interim basis and sent an email 
                                                                                                             
 61. See Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1–2. 
 62. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title IX and 
Sexual Assault, NEW YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-column 
ists/assessing-betsy-devos-proposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 65. Id. at 657. This case was a review of “the magistrate judge’s decision to dismiss 
John’s complaint for failing to state a claim.” Id. at 656. Accordingly, the court “recount[ed] 
the facts as he describes them, drawing every inference in his favor.” Id. So, “the story that 
follows is one-sided because the posture of the case requires it to be.” Id. Nevertheless, the 
procedural problems alleged are not unusual. See, e.g., Lave, supra note 55, at 646–47. 
 66. Doe, 928 F.3d at 657. 
 67. Id. at 657–58. 
 68. Id. at 658 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at 657–58. 
 70. See Lave, supra note 55, at 640–41. This Article borrows from Lave in juxtaposing 
the Winston case with the Sousa case. 
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to the entire student body informing them of the allegations against Sousa.
71
 
When he “requested to review the basis of the allegations against him,” the 
university assured him that he would eventually receive that information 
but suggested that he make a statement immediately since the investigator 
“could reach a decision in the Title IX portion of the investigation at any 
point.”
72
 The university also informed Sousa that the investigator would 
decide issues of fact and law and potentially issue a sanction, but that Sousa 
was “not entitled to a hearing” on the sexual misconduct allegation, that he 
would have no opportunity to question the complainant, that he could not 
have counsel directly participate in the process, and that no appeal would be 
possible.
73
 
These cases exemplify the most common problems that render Title IX 
procedurally unfair to respondents, including no discovery rights, limited 
access to the allegations and to the investigation report, limited or no 
opportunity to present a defense, and a refusal to allow for legal 
representation.
74
 These flaws fall below generally accepted standards of due 
process and, where they occur, usually render adjudications procedurally 
unfair to defendants.
75
 
III. Discriminatory Dualism 
Many scholars and commentators frame the emergence of the reverse 
Title IX strand as an “over-correction,” triggered by schools’ eagerness to 
comply with the Obama-era Title IX regime and retain their federal 
funding.
76
 But this does not fully capture the nature and consequences of 
the procedural switch. Just as the flips in the other examples of 
discriminatory dualism were not “overcorrections,” reverse Title IX is also 
not simply an overcorrection in response to concerns about the first 
discriminatory form. Rather, switching into a reverse mode of 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. at 640; see Gary Warth, SDSU Lifts Suspension Against Student, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2015, 5:31 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/ 
education/sdut-sdsu-lifts-suspension-of-student-accused-of-2015sep01-story.html. 
 72. Lave, supra note 55, at 641. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id.; see also Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 2–3. 
 75. See Lave, supra note 55, at 645. 
 76. Kathryn Joyce, The Takedown of Title IX, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 5, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/magazine/the-takedown-of-title-ix.html; see also Alexandra 
Brodsky, A Rising Tide: Learning About Fair Disciplinary Process from Title IX, 66 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 822, 825 (2017). 
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discriminatory action is a common, reoccurring, and powerful means of 
maintaining social hierarchies and existing status quos.
77
  
The example of workplace sexual harassment and shunning provides the 
closest parallel to Title IX’s current state. In the sexual harassment and 
shunning example of discriminatory dualism, sexual harassment, defined as 
unwanted sexual attention, couples with shunning, defined as no attention at 
all.
78
 After the #MeToo movement exposed the problem and prevalence of 
sexual harassment in the workplace, some male workers responded by 
shunning and simply refusing to work closely or at all with their female 
colleagues.
79
 Academic studies, surveys, and anecdotal data reported that 
over one-quarter of men confirmed that in the post-#MeToo era they would 
“avoid one-on-one meetings with female co-workers,” twenty-one percent 
would “be reluctant to hire women for a job that would require close 
interaction,” and nineteen percent would “be reluctant to hire an attractive 
woman.”
80
  
Like Title IX’s procedural flip, shunning in the workplace was also 
largely framed as an “overcorrection.”
81
 Multiple popular media articles 
explained the movement as male workers trying so hard to comply with not 
sexually harassing someone that they separated themselves entirely from 
                                                                                                             
 77. Swan, supra note 21, at 874–75. 
 78. Id. at 886. 
 79. Id. at 886–87. 
 80. See Arwa Mahdawi, Men Now Avoid Women at Work-Another Sign We Are Being 
Punished for #MeToo, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2019, 1:00 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian. 
com/lifeandstyle/2019/aug/29/men-women-workplace-study-harassment-harvard-metoo. 
 81. See, e.g., #MeToo Backlash Has Employers Telling Staff Not to Overcorrect, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 19, 2018, 11:39 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-
practice/metoo-backlash-has-employers-telling-staff-not-to-overcorrect; Sexual Harassment 
in Law Firms – a Law Office Management Program, NJ INST. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 
(June 26, 2018), https://tcms.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/njicle/CLEPrograms/NJICLE 
EventsCalendar/MeetingDetails.aspx?productId=15143049 (denoting “overcorrecting” as a 
“Tricky Topic”); Laura Johnston, Can you Compliment a Woman’s Outfit at Work? In Wake 
of #MeToo Movement, There Are No Office Guidelines, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.cleveland.com/news/erry-2018/09/06bef3b8632945/can-you-compliment-a-
womans-ou.html; Lili Loofbourow, 8 Big Questions We Need to Ask Ourselves in the Wake 
of America’s Sexual Assault Reckoning, WEEK (Nov. 27, 2017), https://theweek.com/ 
articles/739104/8-big-questions-need-ask-ourselves-wake-americas-sexual-assault-
reckoning; Eleanor Holmes Norton, A Commission to Combat Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace Needs to be Created, HILL (Jan. 31, 2018), https://norton.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/op-ed-a-commission-to-combat-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace-
needs-to.  
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their female colleagues.
82
 Out of a purported fear that any behaviors might 
be misconstrued as harassment, male workers began to refuse to mentor, 
work closely with, or even hire women workers.
83
  
A similar dynamic is seen in Title IX. In both contexts, agitations for 
appropriate policies regarding systemic sexual discrimination are met with 
an opposite but still discriminatory behavior. And in both cases, the switch 
is attributed to a purported fear of negative consequences created by the 
agitators themselves. In the sexual harassment/shunning context, the 
purported fear is that innocent behavior will be misconstrued. In the Title 
IX context, the purported fear is that institutional federal funding will be 
lost.
84
 Like the male workers who protest they are scared of being falsely 
accused, schools have been portrayed as frightened of the possibility of 
having their federal funding pulled. One open letter, for example, refers to 
“terrified” administrators, who, in the wake of the Dear Colleague letter, 
“not only complied; they over-complied.”
85
 
In both contexts, those seeking social justice are blamed for the current 
predicament. Just as those practicing shunning blamed #MeToo advocates 
for driving them to engage in a reverse form of discrimination, some 
commentators and institutions blame the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) 
and gender justice advocates for causing the reverse Title IX problem.
86
 In 
this framing, the threat of losing federal funding was just too much for 
schools to bear, and they therefore tried too hard to comply.
87
 However, it 
is important to note as an initial matter that no school has ever actually lost 
                                                                                                             
 82. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 81. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1–2. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 1 (“While the Administration’s goals were to provide better 
protections for women, and address the neglect that prevailed before this shift, the new 
policies and procedures have created problems of their own, many of them attributable to 
directives coming from the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights . . . .”); see 
also Lave, supra note 55, at 655 (quoting a university administrator as saying, “Whether 
truly innocent, the reality is that OCR wants you to take action against [respondents].”). For 
court decisions suggesting that the Dear Colleague letter helped cause reverse Title IX, see 
Doe v. Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019), and Doe v. Miami University, 
882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018).  
 87. Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1–2. The other implication of the overcorrection 
framing is the suggestion that the “process will eventually right itself” presumably through 
some kind of Hegelian dialectic process, and that the error is just part of a natural process 
moving toward the right balance. Johnston, supra note 81. The history of discriminatory 
dualism suggests that this is not the likely outcome. See Swan, supra note 21, at 925. 
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federal funding as a result of this kind of Title IX complaint.
88
 Even schools 
that behaved so egregiously that other third parties sanctioned them or 
pulled their own funding never lost federal funding.
89
  
Further, neither Title IX nor the Obama-era guidelines demanded 
procedures unfair to respondents.
90
 In fact, of the top ten procedural 
safeguards that the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education presents 
as “fundamental elements of due process,” eight are actually “required by 
Title IX, the Clery Act or the guidance letter.”
91
 
Indeed, as these due process requirements suggest, in many cases the 
schools that engage in procedurally unfair practices for respondents are 
actively violating OCR recommendations. As “one longtime campus-safety 
expert who consults with colleges and universities about sexual 
misconduct” bluntly explained, schools that have been “taking shortcuts to 
justice” are “violating policy or breaking the law.”
92
 The OCR has 
specifically denounced these kinds of process errors. For example, in 2016, 
the OCR found that Wesley College had violated Title IX through 
procedural unfairness to respondents.
93
 Specifically, a student “accused of 
livestreaming a fellow student having sex, without her consent . . . never 
received information from the school about the accusation or the available 
                                                                                                             
 88. Kelly Alison Behre, Deconstructing the Disciplined Student Narrative and Its 
Impact on Campus Sexual Assault Policy, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 885, 914 (2019) (“Although 
OCR has the ability to sanction schools by removing federal aid, it has never done so as a 
result of a Title IX complaint.”). One OCR figure did warn a group of college administrators 
that despite the fact that a loss of funding had never happened, pulling federal funding was 
not “an empty threat.” Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice: Can We Reconcile the Belated 
Attention to Rape on Campus with Due Process, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://prospect.org/justice/sex-lies-justice/. 
 89. See infra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 90. Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Lawsuits Against Universities for Alleged Mishandling of Sexual Misconduct Cases, STOP 
ABUSE & VIOLENT ENV’TS 1 (2016), http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
Sexual-Misconduct-Lawsuits-Report2.pdf (“[M]any colleges implemented changes that 
went well beyond the requirements of the Dear Colleague Letter, such as relying on a single 
investigator to adjudicate the case and imposing interim sanctions before the investigation 
was completed.”); see also Gertner, supra note 88, at 22 (criticizing the procedures Harvard 
implemented and noting that “[n]othing in the OCR’s 2011 ‘Dear Colleague’ letter called for 
a proceeding remotely like this”). 
 91. Joyce, supra note 76 (emphasis added). One of these exceptions is the presumption 
of innocence, which arguably “violates Title IX’s requirement that adjudicators make no 
presumptions whatsoever.” Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Brodsky, supra note 76, at 822. 
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evidence. He was invited to attend an informal educational meeting only to 
discover the ‘chat’ was in fact a disciplinary hearing.”
94
 The OCR held this 
proceeding was a violation of Title IX.
95
 
Heaping blame for reverse Title IX on gender justice advocates is 
similarly misplaced. Like the OCR, many of these groups have specifically 
affirmed the importance of fair procedures in the Title IX context and called 
for remedying “all unjust deprivations of the right to learn.”
96
 For example, 
six organizations penned an open letter to universities urging them to adopt 
procedures fair to all parties.
97
 
Blaming social justice advocates for causing discriminatory practices to 
occur, meeting agitations for change by switching into an opposing form of 
discrimination, and framing that form as an “over-correction” are all 
features of Title IX’s procedural discriminatory dualism that map neatly 
onto the example of sexual harassment/shunning. However, there is one 
important area of apparent disjunction between these two examples: at first 
glance, it appears that the group receiving the Title IX discrimination has 
changed. Since procedures weighted against complainants discriminate 
against complainants, the logical extension is that procedures weighted 
against respondents discriminate against respondents. But discriminatory 
dualism thrives on cognitive dissonance. It rests on the intellectually jarring 
idea that two opposing practices can nevertheless both perpetuate the same 
discriminatory harm.
98
 In the Title IX context, this idea is pushed to its 
extreme, as it would seem that the two practices actually discriminate 
against different groups.  
Notably, though, the separate groups idea also occurred in the context of 
another example of discriminatory dualism. In the context of policing, 
“scholars struggling to make sense of the under and overpolicing 
paradox . . . tried to draw distinctions” between the groups each practice 
involved, suggesting that “underpolicing affects victims, while overpolicing 
affects perpetrators, [and] young people feel overpoliced while older folks 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Know Your IX et al., Letter to University Presidents on Fair Process, 
KNOWYOURIX.ORG (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.knowyourix.org/letter-university-
presidents-fair-process. The six organizations are Know Your IX, Carry That Weight, No 
Red Tape, Our Harvard Can Do Better, CalArts Sexual Respect Task Force, 7,000 in 
Solidarity: A Campaign Against Sexual Assault, and Phoenix Survivors Alliance at the 
University of Chicago.  
 98. See Swan, supra note 21, at 872. 
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feel underprotected.”
99
 In fact, though, these distinctions failed to fully 
account for the complexity of the phenomenon and its impact. 
Such is the case with Title IX’s discriminatory dualism as well. Despite 
initial appearances, Title IX’s discriminatory dualism ultimately functions 
to sustain existing gendered and social hierarchies. On a structural and 
collective level, Title IX’s procedural discriminatory dualism, including 
reverse Title IX, ultimately inures to the detriment of women. This happens 
via three main mechanisms. First, consistent with the usual practices of 
discriminatory dualism, procedural unfairness to respondents functions to 
“confirm” the stereotype underlying the initial procedural problems with 
Title IX: that women are not credible witnesses and are committed, at all 
costs, to punishing men for perceived slights and imagined harms. Second, 
procedural unfairness to respondents enables Title IX opponents to suggest 
that unfairness to defendants is the “real” problem of Title IX adjudication, 
thereby overshadowing and undermining continuing problems of unfairness 
to complainants. The ensuing confusion over what is the “real” problem 
with Title IX processes discredits the entire process of adjudication, 
throwing suspicion onto all findings of responsibility in the Title IX 
context. Finally, discriminatory dualism in Title IX establishes a double 
bind, under which universities are portrayed as capable only of adjudicating 
in ways that are unfair to complainants or unfair to defendants. These 
consequences all work to the detriment of those seeking gender equality.  
A. Stereotype Affirmation 
One hallmark of discriminatory dualism is that it often appears to affirm 
stereotypes.
100
 In the sexual harassment and shunning context, the 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. at 899 n.188; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1715, 1731 (2006). But, as Monica Bell writes, the situation is more complex: “Many 
young men, too, would ideally want the police to protect them and their communities.” 
Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 
2054, 2119 (2017) (describing a “conflicted desire for police protection”). 
 100. For example, in the context of redlining and reverse redlining, the defaults resulting 
from reverse redlining seemingly confirmed the stereotype that “African Americans in 
particular, and people of color in general, are high credit risks and their presence in 
neighborhoods leads to declining property values.” Swan, supra note 21, at 902–03. In 
actuality, “‘although minority borrowers were targeted for subprime loans at 
disproportionate rates,’ simple population demographics mean that ‘they did not receive the 
majority of these loans, nor have they been more prone to foreclosure than white 
homeowners.’” Id. at 903 (quoting Charles L. Nier III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial 
Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Theory of Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending 
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“affirmed” stereotype is that women’s complaints are unreliable, and 
women often complain about nothing. When women complain about both 
sexual harassment and shunning simultaneously, this stereotype looks true: 
women complain when male workers give them too much unwanted sexual 
attention, and then when they are given less attention, they complain about 
that, too. This conflict allows opponents of sexual equality to suggest all the 
complaints are unjustified nonsense.
101
 
The stereotype at work in the Title IX context is similar: that women are 
not credible witnesses and are committed, at all costs, to punishing men for 
perceived slights, imagined harms, and regrets surrounding their own 
engagement in sexual encounters. Title IX procedures that are stacked 
against complainants—like requiring additional corroborating evidence 
before commencing an investigation, or imposing a higher standard of 
evidence—are rooted in this stereotype.  
The stereotype that women are unreliable narrators of sexual harm has a 
long pedigree. One of its more infamous historical moments was Judge 
Matthew Hales’s warning in the seventeenth century that rape is a crime 
“easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended.”
102
 In 
keeping with this stereotype, until rape reform measures began in the 
criminal law in the 1970s, many states required “extrinsic corroborating 
evidence” before they would allow a rape conviction to stand.
103
 A 1970 
law review article purportedly explained how and why women lie about 
rape: “Women often falsely accuse men of sexual attacks to extort money, 
to force marriage, to satisfy a childish desire for notoriety, or to attain 
personal revenge.”
104
 The article also noted that sometimes women were 
simply deluded, and in such cases “these neurotic individuals can often 
deceive the most astute judges and jurors into believing that the imagined 
attack actually occurred.”
105
 
                                                                                                             
Under the Fair Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 941, 948 (2011)). And in the context of under 
and overpolicing, the stereotype serving as an “underlying premise” is that “people of color 
commit more crime and therefore must be subjected to harsher police tactics.” Swan, supra 
note 21, at 901 (quoting ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 2 (2017)). Overpolicing then 
purportedly “reveals” a high level of criminal activity while simultaneously masking the role 
of underpolicing in “perpetuating the problem of unsolved violent crime.” Id. at 902. 
 101. Id. at 904–05.  
 102. The Corroboration Rule and Crimes Accompanying a Rape, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 458, 
458 (1970). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 460. 
 105. Id.  
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This stereotype continues to inform the perceived “dangers” of reverse 
Title IX scenarios. When Title IX’s procedures are unfairly stacked against 
respondents, the stereotype that women are desperate liars who will use 
every means possible to falsely accuse and punish men is purportedly 
affirmed by their seeming push to abandon any due process restraints that 
could challenge their onslaught of false accusations.
106
 In essence, the lack 
of procedural fairness becomes yet another method women use to 
perpetuate their false accusations of sexual harm, reaffirming the initial 
position of Title IX: that stacking the procedural deck against complainants 
is necessary, justified, and correct.
107
  
B. Confusion over the “Real” Title IX Problem 
Another common thread in examples of discriminatory dualism is that its 
bifurcation into two seemingly opposing strands confuses the true nature of 
the problem.
108
 The inherent contradiction in a situation of two opposing 
problematic practices is befuddling.
109
 Commentators have helpfully given 
voice to this confusion in the context of under and overpolicing, “How can 
a community be simultaneously over-policed and under-policed?”
110
 “Are 
there too many police or are there too few?”
111
 The two strands seem as 
though they should cancel each other out, and that both should not be able 
to occur simultaneously.
112
 
In the Title IX context, it is difficult to reconcile procedural unfairness to 
complainants co-existing with procedural unfairness to respondents, and 
those arguing for a diminished role for Title IX have thus been able to float 
reverse Title IX as the “real,” more dominant problem.
113
 With this telling, 
                                                                                                             
 106. See Emily Yoffe, Reining in the Excesses of Title IX, ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/title-ix-reforms-are-overdue/569215/; 
see also Joyce, supra note 76. 
 107. Joyce, supra note 76; see also Swan, supra note 21, at 905 (citing Deborah Epstein 
& Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ 
Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2019)).  
 108. Swan, supra note 21, at 899. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Natapoff, supra note 99, at 1718. 
 111. Vann R. Newkirk II, What We Are Getting Wrong About Police Reform, GAWKER 
(Nov. 9, 2015 12:50 PM), https://gawker.com/what-we-are-getting-wrong-about-police-
reform-1740865621. 
 112. See Swan, supra note 21, at 899–900. 
 113. See, e.g., Home, SAVE OUR SONS, https://helpsaveoursons.com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 
2020) (introducing an organization “dedicated to the families whose college sons have been 
falsely accused of sexual misconduct”); see also Behre, supra note 88, at 900. 
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the main problem with Title IX adjudication is that it has become a way to 
oppress men.
114
 This position has been given extra heft by concerns over 
whether reverse Title IX perpetuates racial injustice and disproportionately 
punishes Black men and men of color.
115
 Unfortunately, obtaining specific 
data on race and Title IX is difficult because the OCR does not gather this 
information.
116
 We know that racism is part of the bedrock of the American 
legal system, but there is “little specific information about the scope, 
frequency, or impact of racism on accused and disciplined students in 
campus sexual misconduct adjudications.”
117
  
Nevertheless, some of the information that does exist is deeply 
troubling.
118
 For example, one collection of data from Colgate University 
suggests that in 2012–2013, while Black students comprised only 4.2 
percent of the student population, they comprised 50 percent of those 
accused of sexual misconduct and “40 percent of the students who went 
through the formal disciplinary process.”
119
 Sending a disproportionate 
number of Black men through the Title IX complaint system accords with 
“[t]he general social disadvantage that black men continue to carry in our 
culture,” which “make[s] it easier for everyone in the adjudicative process 
to put the blame on them,”
120
 and corresponds with the tradition that white 
society has “long over-sexualized, over-criminalized and disproportionately 
punished black men.”
121
 
At the same time, though, these conversations sometimes ignore the 
perspectives of Black women and women of color, and the racial impacts of 
procedural unfairness to complainants.
122
 As one commentator noted, two 
cases that have been held up as examples of potential racism against Black 
                                                                                                             
 114. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Higher Education Discriminates Against Men, but 
Title IX Complaints May Change That, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM ET) (noting 
that Title IX “has been turned into a club with which to beat male students”). 
 115. See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Sex Bureaucracy, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-sex-bureaucracy/. 
 116. Lara Bazelon, I’m a Democrat and a Feminist. And I Support Betsy DeVos’s Title IX 
Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/opinion/-title-ix-
devos-democrat-feminist.html.  
 117. Behre, supra note 88, at 937. 
 118. Bazelon, supra note 116. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (citing Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX 
Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103 (2015)). 
 121. Bazelon, supra note 116. 
 122. Behre, supra note 88, at 938. 
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men are often referenced without acknowledging that they also suggest that 
white women and women of color receive disparate outcomes when they 
accuse the same person of sexual misconduct.
123
 One student queried why 
commentators seem quick to agree “that Black men are disproportionately 
and wrongly implicated in on-campus sexual assault proceedings,” yet 
“ignore[] well-established research on the disproportionate rate at which 
women of color are sexually assaulted.”
124
  
The confusion created by dueling procedural problems allows reverse 
Title IX to be presented as the main problem of campus sexual assault 
adjudication. From there, reverse Title IX overshadows and undermines the 
continuing procedural problems to complainants, including Black women 
and women of color.
125
 Further, the contestation of this positioning and the 
confusion created by the seemingly competing complaints of unfairness to 
respondents and unfairness to complainants functions to undermine all 
findings made within the Title IX system. Procedures that are unfair to 
complainants in some instances and unfair to respondents in others make it 
seem like the whole system is simply unworkable and produces results that 
cannot be trusted. Whereas due process allows a community to be confident 
in adjudicative outcomes, doubts about process can make all holdings seem 
suspect.
126
 The emergence of reverse Title IX and the rhetoric surrounding 
it join with the paradoxical nature of Title IX’s procedural problems to cast 
a cloud of suspicion over all findings made under the system, no matter 
how valid they may be.  
C. Discriminatory Dualism’s Double Bind 
Another conceptual trap of discriminatory dualism is that the opposing 
practice is presented as an answer or solution to the first practice.
127
 
Reverse Title IX emerged as an apparent response to complainants’ calls 
for a fairer process. The binary thereby formed is a false dichotomy under 
which complainants appear to have “gotten what they asked for.”
128
 Even 
though neither Title IX advocates nor the OCR requested to switch from a 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id. at 939. 
 124. Kamilah Willingham, To the Harvard 19: Do Better, MEDIUM (Mar. 14, 2016), 
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 125. See Behre, supra note 88, at 939. 
 126. See Brodsky, supra note 76, at 830–31. 
 127. Swan, supra note 21, at 912. 
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process that was weighted against complainants to one weighted against 
respondents, by positioning itself as an answer to the first procedural 
fairness problem, reverse Title IX creates a double bind of only two 
possibilities: unfairness to complainants, or unfairness to respondents.  
In this binary, procedural fairness to respondents and redress for campus 
sexual assault are presented as mutually exclusive: you can have one, but 
not the other.
129
 In this “zero-sum game” framing, “any increase in civil 
rights obtained by students to be free from sexual misconduct results in a 
reciprocal decrease in rights for male students.”
130
 The political message of 
this position is that “[s]chools can either prevent and respond to gender 
violence or protect accused students’ rights,” but not both.
131
 Notions and 
imagery like “overcorrections” and “a pendulum swinging too far”
132
 
suggest “a single axis of justice . . . on which every gain for one side is a 
loss of the other.”
133
  
Many scholars and commentators decry this false dichotomy, and point 
out that advancing procedural fairness to respondents and creating a campus 
safe from sexual violence are not mutually exclusive goals.
134
 Rather, 
everyone has an interest in both goals being met, and “procedural pitfalls, 
like biased boards, insufficient transparency, untrained staff, and poor 
guidance” are harmful to both victims and accused students.
135
 They 
elongate already “painful process[es]” as “internal appeals and subsequent 
litigation” delay closure and healing.
136
 Advocates of Title IX are keenly 
aware that “[n]o one wins when processes are unfair,”
137
 and that the 
procedural unfairness that currently plagues Title IX is profoundly 
“counter-productive, undermining the legitimacy of the important project of 
addressing sexual misconduct.”
138
 The entire community is best served 
when Title IX is perceived as procedurally fair: 
Just as fair criminal procedures encourage people to ‘buy in’ to 
legal systems and ‘adhere to agreements and follow rules over 
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 130. Behre, supra note 88, at 927. 
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 135. Id. at 828–29. 
 136. Id. at 828. 
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time,’ ethical and equitable campus disciplinary procedures will 
likely improve student participants’ trust in hearing boards and 
acceptance of their decisions. Over time, fair procedures should 
lead to greater community faith in campus discipline, allowing 
colleges to take the steps necessary to build safe and just 
campuses.
139
 
Title IX’s discriminatory dualism, though, sets up two untenable options 
as the only possibilities, and does so using a frame in which fairness to 
complainants and fairness to respondents seem irreconcilable. Not 
surprisingly, then, this apparent double bind has caused many 
commentators to “throw up their hands and propose . . . that schools should 
not decide these cases at all,” and that sexual misconduct allegations should 
instead be handled by law enforcement.
140
 
Unfortunately, law enforcement and the criminal system of adjudication 
are not effective mechanisms for addressing sexual assault.
141
 As Catherine 
MacKinnon once summarized, “In the United States most rapes are never 
reported. Most reported rapes are not prosecuted. Most prosecuted rapes do 
not result in convictions. The vast majority of rapists are never held 
accountable for their actions.”
142
 From rape kit backlogs to persistent 
inattention from the police, criminal law enforcement activities have shown 
little to no ability to fairly adjudicate sexual assault claims.
143
 Thus, the net 
result of the recommendations to transfer all adjudications to the criminal 
system would be to diminish any chance of remedy or redress for rape and 
campus sexual misconduct. 
This result would thwart the entire purpose of Title IX. Relinquishing all 
sexual misconduct claims to the criminal system would not assist goals of 
educational access. It is paramount that “[a] school . . . be able to discipline 
students for violating its conduct codes and protect its students from harm, 
whether or not the violations are also crimes.”
144
 But the double bind of 
Title IX’s discriminatory dualism suggests that schools are simply unable to 
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fairly adjudicate claims of sexual misconduct.
145
 This message destabilizes 
and undermines the entire remedial system. 
IV. Discriminatory Dualism and the Future of Title IX 
Title IX’s double bind functions to narrow the perceived field of options 
to only two choices: unfairness to complainants or unfairness to 
respondents. In limiting the perceived possibilities of the system, the 
discriminatory dualism of Title IX serves to “repress aspirations for 
alternative . . . arrangements.”
146
 The sphere of available answers becomes 
limited to a bleak future where either campus sexual assault adjudication is 
removed from the purview of Title IX or Title IX simply oscillates between 
its two procedurally unfair forms in perpetuity. 
A. The New Title IX Regulations 
At the time of this writing, Title IX is currently poised at the precipice of 
another significant oscillation. In response to the untenable situation created 
by Title IX’s discriminatory dualism, the Trump Administration created a 
new set of regulations, which took effect in August 2020.
147
 These 
regulations were open to a lengthy notice and comment period and attracted 
numerous responses on both sides of the issue.
148
 The new procedural 
regime created by these regulations includes some reasonable procedural 
requirements. For example, schools must give the accused student written 
notice detailing the allegations, let students review the evidence the 
investigation report relies on, and allow students to respond in writing 
before the report is filed.
149
 But the new regulations also include more 
controversial requirements.
150
 Under the new regulations, schools must 
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 146. See Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
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employ a presumption of innocence, rather than the former neutral stance, 
hold a “live hearing that could include cross-examination” (conducted by 
someone other than the accused student and possibly with the students in 
separate rooms), and use a clear and convincing evidentiary standard if that 
standard is used in any other disciplinary context.
151
 
Changes like a higher evidentiary standard portend a return to weighting 
Title IX adjudication against complainants. Concerned public and private 
actors thus filed numerous lawsuits challenging the new regulations.
152
 The 
Attorneys General of almost twenty states filed suit, arguing that the rules 
are arbitrary and capricious,
153
 and gender and social justice advocacy 
centers, supported by a group of law professors, also challenged the 
rules.
154
 These groups argued that the new regulations reinvigorate the 
gender stereotype that caused the initial procedural problems with Title IX 
and that “[t]he department’s decision to single out sex-based harassment for 
uniquely burdensome and inequitable procedures is evidence of their intent 
to discriminate based on sex.”
155
 Challengers also note that “[s]kepticism of 
women reporting sexual misconduct is so ingrained in our culture and legal 
history that the mere suggestion that a student could be disciplined for a 
campus code violation involving sexual misconduct based on 50.1% 
certainty—the preponderance of evidence standard—regularly invokes 
outrage,”
156
 and the new regulations are supporting such skepticism.  
                                                                                                             
college students live, or to complete their inquiry within 60 days. Professors and 
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Further, although the new regulations purport to merely allow schools to 
adopt a higher evidentiary standard, in reality, they are structured in such a 
way that a higher standard will be “effectively required, in many cases.”
157
 
For cases involving potential sexual harassment, the new regulations 
require schools to apply the same standard to sexual misconduct allegations 
against students as they do for faculty. But the collective bargaining 
agreements and contracts that govern faculty disciplinary hearings usually 
require a clear and convincing standard to be used.
158
 In other words, “the 
New Rule effectively imposes a heightened standard as a requirement for 
student complaints without saying so.”
159
  
The significance of the applicable standard of proof for sexual 
misconduct complaints is hard to overstate. The consequences of a higher 
standard are “impossible to ignore . . . [H]istory shows that this type of 
complacency has led to inequality, harassment and real harm to women and 
vulnerable members of society.”
160
 In fact, the new regulations are 
consciously designed to “reduce the number of sexual harassment 
allegations the schools investigate and remedy,” with the Department itself 
estimating that the new regulations will result in postsecondary schools 
conducting 33% fewer investigations, K-12 schools conducting 50% fewer 
investigations, and a reduction in the number of “hearings, decisions, and 
informal resolutions” more generally.
161
 In accordance with how deterrence 
operates, “overwhelming evidence” suggests that a decrease in the number 
of investigations will lead to an increase in harassment occurrences.
162
 
B. Paths Forward 
Discriminatory dualism creates systems with a polarity that is difficult to 
break. When complainants called for fairer procedures, some schools 
answered with procedures that blatantly worked against respondents, 
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though this is not what complainants requested. Most recently, though, 
when respondents called for fairer procedures, they were answered with the 
Trump Administration’s rules, which will likely work against complainants 
once again and actually satisfy the requests of many men’s rights groups.
163
 
There are templates for equitable procedures that could work within the 
Title IX context—like those of the civil courts
164
 or universal student 
conduct codes, for example.
165
 But in the current political environment and 
within Title IX’s current system of procedural discriminatory dualism, it is 
increasingly difficult to imagine that any proposed procedure will 
ultimately be implemented in a way that achieves the goals of Title IX.
166
  
In circumstances where agitations for change are met with systems that 
reify existing hierarchies, survivors of sexual violence remain 
understandably reluctant to pursue remedies through formal legal structures 
like Title IX.
167
 When “[t]he legal logics that produce patterns of silence in 
response to sexual violence are [so] deeply embedded in socio-cultural 
structures and norms” that even formal law reforms cannot displace them, it 
becomes challenging to see any path forward.
168
 Yet the double bind of 
discriminatory dualism may, perhaps ironically, provide an opportunity for 
reconceptualization.
169
  
Other discriminatory dualism examples suggest that polarities will 
continue to govern unless a solution is crafted that anticipates the rise of the 
reverse form occurring and aims beyond the problematic institutions.
170
 
Indeed, sometimes the only discernible fix for discriminatory dualism is 
moving away from the institutions engaged in the discriminatory 
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practices.
171
 For example, one way to break away from redlining and 
reverse redlining is to disinvest from the financial institutions that continue 
to discriminate in these ways, opting instead to use banks with better track 
records.
172
 But given the hierarchical structure of post-secondary education 
in the United States, simply refusing to affiliate with certain institutions 
may not be an effective response in this context.  
Nevertheless, Title IX’s discriminatory dualism might provide a moment 
to query how the mission of Title IX could be supported by other measures 
not wholly dependent on ex post adjudication, including more attention to 
preventative measures and measures that focus on the cultural norms which 
allow these forms of violence to flourish in the first place.
173
 Then, instead 
of seeking justice by focusing on formally punishing perpetrators, 
approaches emphasizing the healing, empowerment, and agency of 
survivors can be explored.
174
 It may be that “the limits of formal law as a 
mechanism for promoting justice for survivors of sexual violence” urge us 
to move away from reliance on legal vehicles that respond only after 
violence has occurred, and instead drive us to “pursue initiatives that seek 
to transform culture and to reduce the incidence of sexual violence.”
175
 
These initiatives might include “[m]ajor efforts to expand socio-cultural 
understandings of consent and initiatives to educate young people about 
consent and healthy sexual relationships,”
176
 with the goal of “reduc[ing] 
the incidence of sexual violence and . . . pursu[ing] justice rooted in gender 
equity.”
177
 
Such initiatives fit well with the educational mission of colleges and 
universities.
178
 Numerous states have little to no sex education for their 
secondary school students, meaning many students arrive on college 
campuses with little or no sexual sophistication or knowledge. For example, 
in Texas, “sixty percent of Texas public school districts teach abstinence 
only sex education and 25 percent have no sex education programs at 
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L. 365 (2016). 
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all.”
179
 More focus on ensuring young adults have received education on 
issues of intimacy, sex, and consent could reinforce norms about 
appropriate sexual conduct
180
 and assist the resolve of young people to 
discourage others from engaging in inappropriate conduct.
181
 
In addition to this type of preventative work, a wider range of redress 
mechanisms could be offered.
182
 Traditional disciplinary hearings need not 
be the only method of redressing sexual harm when it has occurred on 
campus: restorative or transformative justice frameworks may provide 
mechanisms of accountability that some sexual harm survivors prefer over 
standard adjudication using any set of procedural rules.
183
 Although these 
kinds of mechanisms risk being coopted into tools for replicating and 
reifying existing social hierarchies, mindfully guarding against these 
influences may allow these processes to flourish and offer victims a greater 
role in choosing what form of repair would be most meaningful to them.
184
 
Restorative and transformative justice may offer much to all stakeholders in 
redressing sexual violence: 
For those harmed, restoration means repairing the actual damage 
caused by wrongdoing and restoring their sense of control over 
their lives. For wrongdoers, restoration involves accepting 
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responsibility for their actions by repairing any harm that they 
caused and dealing with the issues that contributed to the 
wrongdoing. For the community, restoration means denouncing 
wrongdoers’ behavior and assisting victims and offenders in 
their process of restoration.
185
 
Transformative justice goes one step further, encouraging “imagination 
beyond [the] current system” that can root out the underlying structures and 
supports of sexual violence, and envision new alternatives and 
possibilities.
186
 
V. Conclusion 
Redressing sexual misconduct and violence in any context is a difficult 
endeavor. Complicating the task even further are “the ways in which formal 
laws governing sexual violence may reproduce legal logics that reinforce 
rather than challenge gendered social orders and patterns of violence.”
187
 
Discriminatory dualism is one means by which such reification, rather than 
transformation, sometimes occurs, and discriminatory dualism has impeded 
Title IX’s ability to serve as a successful mechanism for redressing sexual 
assault on campus.  
With the looming implementation of the regulations crafted by the 
Trump administration, Title IX seems all but certain to continue to fail 
victims of campus sexual misconduct. Yet the current fears over what Title 
IX will look like as these new regulations are implemented also presents a 
moment of opportunity for gender and social justice advocates. 
Recognizing Title IX’s current discriminatory dualism as a symptom of 
intense dysfunction and discrimination prompts reimagining what a 
different system might look like. Recognizing that procedural rules for 
disciplinary hearings are unlikely to offer, at least in the near future, the 
kind of redress many survivors hope for may compel the development of 
revolutionary and transformative ideas outside of the disciplinary hearing. 
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